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Abstract
Foolishness discourse is prominent in the Pauline letters, not only because of its 
statistical prevalence but also because of its centrality to the argumentation in the 
letters. Paul’s arguments on wisdom and foolishness are mostly done in close proximity 
to the associated notions of strength and weakness, and together reverberate within 
the context of the all-pervasive, all-powerful Roman Empire, as both the reflection 
and distillate of it, as well as the fabricator and promotor of similar notions and values. 
The focus of this contribution is to understand the importance of Paul’s self-portrayal 
as fool for the discourse he constructs in 1 Corinthians 1–4, and in particular, for his 
apostolic self-understanding and the portrayal and presentation of his message within 
this foolishness discourse.
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1. Contrasting foolishness claims
In the NT, Paul can accuse his addressees or opponents in certain settings 
of being stupid (ἀνόητοι Gal 3:1, 3; see also ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε think different 
Phil 3:15),2 but in another context, he made foolishness into a virtue (1 Cor 
1  This contribution is in honour of Johann Cilliers, an excellent scholar, dedicated 
practical theologian, and good friend, who explored the significance of a rhetoric of 
folly as a characteristic of the Gospel, to be emulated also today by Christian preachers 
and in Christian communities of faith (see Campbell and Cilliers 2012).
2  For such notions in the Deutero-Pauline letters, see e g cf ἀνοήτους (ἐπιθυμίας) foolish 
(desires) 1 Tm 6:9; ἀνόητοι foolish Ti 3:3; also μωρολογία silly talk Eph 5:4; ἄφρονες 
foolish Eph 5:17; and, τὰς δὲ μωρὰς (καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ζητήσεις) stupid (and senseless 
controversies) 2 Tm 2:23; μωρὰς (ζητήσεις) stupid (controversies) Ti 3:9. 
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1–4), with no apparent sense of contradiction. In fact, not only did Paul 
present foolishness as a virtue, he even claimed it for himself (1 Cor 4:10; cf 
3:18). While these claims are made in different letters, the oppositions are 
jarring, and the logic of Paul’s overarching approach can appear to be under 
pressure. Through repetitive listening, modern-day church congregations 
may have lost their sensitivity to observing these contrasts, although these 
very disparities appear to be of critical importance in Pauline rhetoric.3 
Using the first-century context to make sense of these and other claims in 
Paul’s letters not only adds further relief to such claims, but appropriately 
situates the very claims and their significance. Apposite attention to socio-
historical settings of course does not resolve all problems. While vilifying 
opponents as unwise and stupid was not uncommon at all in the first-
century, the contrasting claims directed at the self, already on face value 
may have sounded jarring and requires more investigation. 
Interpreting positive claims on foolishness in their first-century contexts 
does, however, provide the proper setting for making sense of Pauline 
claims and guard against the tyranny of the present. To some extent, the 
dissonance generated by those claims would have been greater in the first-
century context where people prized wisdom and generally wanted to avoid 
association with mental disorder or mere stupidity, both of which were 
used to disparage others and often were the brunt of contemporary crude 
jokes. And given the gendered nature of life in the first century and the 
association of women with foolishness, Paul’s assumption of foolishness 
threatened not only his identity but also his very masculinity. Was Paul 
merely oblivious to or even frivolous about the stakes involved, was he 
perhaps guilty of contradicting himself, or was it simply a matter that, 
when apostles fool around, different rules are at play? Were audiences, also 
in the past, perhaps just much more forgiving of (ostensible) contradictions 
that were present in the claims of their leadership? Or were these disparate 
and inconsistent claims part of Paul’s foolishness rhetoric, feeding into a 
more comprehensive and sustained discourse?
3 In Rom 1:14–15, one of the fundamental distinctions Paul made, on par with the 
distinction between Greeks and “barbarians” or others, is between the wise and the 
foolish (14  Ἕλλησίν τε καὶ βαρβάροις, σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις ὀφειλέτης εἰμί, 15 οὕτως 
τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον καὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ εὐαγγελίσασθαι.)
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Johan Cilliers, working jointly with Chuck Campbell, supported the 
position that Paul deliberately played the fool. Leaning on the exegetical 
spadework of mainly Welborn and Marcus and using the theological 
insights of Brown, Campbell and Cilliers (2012) fleshed out the importance 
of Paul’s folly discourse in 1 Corinthians for homiletics, and beyond. In 
this contribution I want to engage with and expand elements within their 
discussion, particularly on the manner and nature in which Paul implicated 
himself and his message in the mechanics of power by constructing a 
discourse of foolishness (Punt 2013:107–28). This pursues my earlier work, 
where I argued for the significance of understanding Paul’s wisdom-
foolishness binary in connection with the strength-weakness binary, but 
also for the importance of situating such binaries within and in relation to 
the imperial context and values of the first century CE. Given the central 
importance of Paul’s discourse of foolishness in 1 Corinthians 1–4, my focus 
here shifts to the discourse’s significance for his self-understanding and his 
understanding of his message.4 But first, a brief consideration of specific 
explanations for Paul’s use of the foolishness rhetoric, in 1 Corinthians 
and elsewhere, and identifying some important socio-historical markers, 
are in order.
2. Wisening up a foolish NT apostle
The centuries-long interpretive tradition of Pauline reception, but for 
the exception here or there such as Räisänen (1992) who described Paul’s 
argumentation as incoherent, found innovative ways to defend Paul 
against his own claims.5 Typically, Paul’s claims about his own foolishness 
would be argued or theologised away, in an attempt to wisen up the 
foolish apostle as is often found in traditional biblical commentaries on 
his letters. A theological appropriation of Paul, complete in categories 
reminiscent of more recent systematic theological reflection, and often of 
4 In this way, I of course take up and expand on the important and very useful discussion 
of 1 Cor 1:17–25 and 4:9–10 found in Campbell and Cilliers (2012, 17–38).
5 Contemporary interpreting communities constantly have to choose the moment in 
which to interpret texts, choosing whether to align themselves with an authoritarian 
role claimed by Paul or that of dependency required of the communities addressed, 
and also whether the particularly attitude accompanying the role is appropriate today 
(Polaski 2005:80–81).
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a decidedly Reformed bent, has been for many decades – and in certain 
instances, still is – the dominant interpretive pattern for making sense of 
the Pauline materials.6 Notwithstanding increasing acknowledgements 
that “Paul’s argument is launched in a very specific rhetorical situation, 
and is not meant to be a broad philosophical pronouncement or the 
foundation for a systematic theology” (Nasrallah 2003:93), scholars in 
general and theologians in particular tend to still drift precisely towards 
a systemising approach of the Pauline materials. If the specificity required 
by occasional letters is not enough to augur against imposing a monolithic 
and predictable interpretive framework on Paul’s writings, his explicit 
choice for foolishness or stupidity and the unwise, ironically, should 
caution against systematising impositions on his letters.
Of late, the comic-philosophical tradition which foregrounded the wise 
fool in the ironic, vulgar and counter-cultural format of mime, has been 
suggested as the proper social location for Paul’s emphasis on the cross and 
the overturning of the established understandings of wisdom.7 Making 
use of the theatrical tradition and providing a vast and wide range of 
contemporary authors and scenarios as illustration, Welborn shows how 
the comic mimic of the coarse, vulgar fool with its entertainment value 
for the crowds – amidst the vulgarity of the performance – harboured an 
important, if at times subtle, anti-establishment element as well.8 However, 
some of the most important aspects related to foolishness, even when they 
6 Even if the briefest of investigations already show up vast differences between, say, 
the work of Ridderbos (1975), the study by Dunn (1998), and the recent publication by 
Wright (2013), but the theological and Reformed emphasis is clear in all three studies.
7 Most recently, Welborn has forcefully propounded the theory, that “Paul was governed 
by a social constraint in his discourse about the cross and in his account of the 
sufferings of the apostles of Christ” … “employs the language and imagery of mime” 
… “theatrical metaphor becomes explicit in 1 Cor 4:9–10 (theatre-act θεάτρον)”, and 
“accepts the role of fool of Christ, but only after a thorough theological analysis, in 
the course of which he redefines the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘foolishness’ in a paradoxical 
sense” (Welborn 2005:3, 253, see also 2002).
8 An important matter that Welborn barely addresses (Welborn 2005:e.g. 5, 7) is the 
parity between Paul and the authors he quotes, as well as the accompanying social 
locations. Seneca, Pliny, Horace and others not only belonged to but also addressed 
an elite or elite-oriented audience, unlike in the case of Paul. The arguments that 1 
Corinthians is focused on the few members in the congregation from elite stock, or 
that the foolishness argument is intended to subvert aspirations to elite-status, do not 
succeed in fully addressing the problem of incongruent social locations.
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are recognised, are not always sufficiently accounted for among scholars. 
The argument that “it is not ‘wisdom’ (σοφία) that is the counterpoint to 
‘foolishness’ (μωρία) in the thesis statement in 1:18, but the ‘power of God’ 
(δύναμις θεοῦ)”, is important for Welborn’s (2005:19) argument. But in the 
subsequent analysis, unfortunately little further attention is devoted to the 
issue of “power”,9 even though wisdom and foolishness in 1 Corinthians 
1–4 can hardly be understood outside of the reigning discourse of power 
(see also Punt 2013).
Then also, the comic-theatre was but one tradition situated in a wider ancient 
context, where foolishness was not celebrated but at best avoided, and at 
worst, demeaned. “The ancient usage of the word ‘fool’ describes a person 
who is cognitively impaired and cannot make sense and cannot function 
with normal thoughtful reflection, and so behaves unwisely, lacking the 
ability to know better or do better” (Kellenberger 2013:450).10 Apart from 
the person playing the fool or being the clown, and notwithstanding 
modern reluctance to engage the topic, being mentally challenged was 
recognised as a reality in ancient times. Although hardly a coveted position 
or status, matters were more ambiguous, since mental disorder or madness 
in ancient times were seldom seen as singularly bad or negative. “The basic 
element of the popular view of mental abnormality was the belief that it 
resulted from the action of a supernatural power which had either entered 
the body or produced its effects by action from outside. When madness was 
linked to demonic possession in this way it is not surprising to find that 
the mentally disturbed could be treated with some awe” (Toner 2009:85).11 
Ambiguously, those in society who were stigmatised and vilified for 
9 The neglect of power and its relationship to wisdom and foolishness is twofold, in 
the sense in which Paul’s argument on power is invoked here: both the importance 
of wisdom for the imperial constellation of power (as referred to above), but also in 
terms of Paul’s own exercising of power. The claim that “the adoption of the role of fool 
was a strategy practiced by a number of intellectuals in Greek and Roman antiquity” 
(Welborn 2005:112) should at least allow for the consideration of Paul’s invocation of 
power in his wisdom and foolishness argument.
10 The Roman imperial context was harsh, especially for those not fitting the mould. 
“Mental health problems for most Romans, though, did not involve costly treatment 
by such medical doctors. The severely affected were left to wander, abandoned by their 
families” (Toner 2009:74–75). See also Laes (2018:37–79).
11 “Roman society was a strongly somatic culture at the dominant level, whereas the 
popular placed more emphasis on the demonic as an explanatory agent” (Toner 2009:91)
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mentally not conforming, were often regarded in ways that exceeded their 
lifestyles and social standing. Moreover, given the nature of first-century 
life, it is not too difficult to understand the presence of mental disabilities 
and disorders in society.
The nature of life in the ancient world of the Roman Empire, meant that 
the non-elite were confronted persistently with potent social stressors. 
The intensity of the stressors increased down the hierarchy, impacting 
particularly on the large component of slaves of different categories. 
These conditions would have had a detrimental impact on the non-elite’s 
psychological well-being, and in all likelihood led to poor mental health 
levels (Toner 2009:74). Ancient society had mechanisms with which some 
of the social stress was regularly relieved. Such measures hardly functioned 
in the sense of envisioning a different dispensation and more often served 
rather to entrench the existing social order.12 Nevertheless, it is not difficult 
to understand, that events such as the annual Saturnalia festivities which 
focussed on equality as much as inversion, also celebrated the fool.13 “The 
fool summed up this spirit of mockery, being free to make public what 
was normally private, and to tease the powerful about their weaknesses 
and indiscretions. He was frank, unofficial and rude” (Toner 2009:95). The 
fool epitomised the inversion that characterised a festival like Saturnalia, 
poking fun at the conventional, and showing up the taken-for-granted 
establishment and its deeply held concerns. In ancient times, then, people 
invoked foolishness discourse across a broad spectrum, often in diverse but 
intense ways, and always in relation to societal power writ large or small.
As is already evident from his letters but supported also by broad ranging 
perceptions of the time, the Pauline foolishness discourse involved more 
than people’s personal lives and beliefs and would have impacted their 
lives also along what today would be called socio-political spheres of life. 
Paul’s appeal for a different understanding of wisdom and appearance was 
12 Such festivals were no real threat to the social fabric of society: “It is possible to see 
carnivals as mere safety-valves that allowed the people to let off a bit of steam without 
harbouring any pretence of bringing real change. Inversion without subversion” (Toner 
2009:95).
13 It is nevertheless fairly ironical that a social stress-relieving event could valorise those 
figures, who at least to some extent owed their very status if not existence to the stress-
inducing nature of the contemporary society.
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part of his larger discourse and can be read as an attempt to engage with 
and confront the conventions of his day (1 Cor 1:18–31). Since the Roman 
Empire at the time largely defined wisdom in the first century, Paul’s 
rhetoric of foolishness can be viewed as criticism of the imperial discourse 
of wisdom and power. A postcolonial optic, in particular, enables one to 
see Paul’s discourse as mimicry, negotiating power as much with discursive 
Roman colonialism as with the recipients of his letters, especially when 
viewed from the perspective of Paul’s use of the scriptures of Israel.14 Paul’s 
arguments on wisdom and foolishness and the associated notions of strength 
and weakness, reverberated within the context of the all-pervasive, all-
powerful Roman Empire, as both the reflection and distillate of it, as well 
as the fabricator and promotor of similar notions and values. The imperial 
context was the underlying ideological setting for Paul’s self-portrayal as 
fool in 1 Corinthians 1–4, both for his apostolic self-understanding and for 
portraying his message as a discourse of foolishness. 
3. Foolishness discourse: Paul the Apostle
The Pauline letters with its foolishness discourse would have conjured up 
a spectrum of these power-related, contra-conventional and inversionist 
notions among their first-century readers recipients, in particular about 
Paul and his message. The stakes remained high in foolishness discourse of 
the time, not only because of the ambiguous but also because of the gendered 
nature of foolishness. The first-century world, in particular and explicitly, 
ascribed intelligence to men and foolishness to women, which was a tricky 
situation in a world where being biological male did not simply translate 
into masculinity taken for granted. Men had to live up to expectations and 
to prove their masculinity, most often in competition with other men.15 
“[A]ncient masculinity was constituted more by the shape of one’s life than 
by the shape of one’s body” (Conway 2008:16). Like the body, gender, at 
14 For more elaboration on these interrelated notions, and how they play out in Paul’s 
arguments, see for example Punt (2013:107–28).
15 “One might be born a male (Greek arsēn; Latin mas) or a human (anthrōpos, homo) 
and still not be a man (anēr, vir); one could only become a vir by energetically seeking 
honour, which was seen as a moral quality, denoting virtue and courage” (Osiek and 
Pouya 2010:45–46; see Smit 2012).
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the time, also existed on a single spectrum and was therefore inherently 
unstable.16 Maleness was valued while effeminacy had to be avoided, and 
therefore being a woman was the last thing first-century men aspired to 
(Osiek and Pouya 2010:46). And the point was that masculinity was not 
derived, it was acquired and therefore continuously under threat. Maleness 
may have been informed by biology, but maleness was not determined by 
a body: “Manliness was not a birth right. It was something that had to be 
won” (Gleason 1995:159). Since masculinity required actions that would 
inscribe it (Swancutt 2004:55), first-century males avoided gender slippage 
through accepting these culturally determined gender behaviour and roles. 
So too, in 1 Corinthians 11:23–25, Paul’s boasting of his beatings (Glancy 
2004:99–135) is ambiguous on many different levels: boasting about 
suffering, which can perhaps be explained with reference to Hebrew Bible 
traditions; masculine infringement that would have conjured up untypical, 
vulnerable male images; and, differently constituted claims on power, to 
a name a few. For the ancients, real men were not only those who could 
assert themselves, or who could do exercise restraint, but also those who 
could do any of these intelligently and who avoided foolishness (see also 
Punt 2016:1–9). Exactly that which Paul as a man would not have wanted 
was to attract the label of foolishness, as it impinged on men’s status, 
their masculinity and their very identity. So, when Paul invoked the fool 
and created his foolishness discourse, was Paul fooling around or was he 
playing the fool?
Paul’s use of notions like ἄφρων (foolish), ἀνόητοι (fools) and μωρία 
(foolishness)17 formed part of a larger discourse of foolishness, in which 
he positioned himself securely but carefully. Paul’s arguments, also on 
foolishness, were imbued with much rhetorical force and power, regardless 
16 As much as masculinity has always been an indication on a broader human gender or 
sex spectrum, its first-century form did not allow for exhibiting what may have been 
perceived as femininity. Avoiding a feminine or effeminate appearance meant that 
discipline, self-control, military skill, good looks, modesty in dress and behaviour, 
intellectual growth, justified anger, and being seen as “active” were promoted among 
men in favour of a masculine form. “Masculinity and femininity were located on 
two different poles of a spectrum, which inscribes the interrelation of masculinity or 
femininity as superior/inferior, societal status as more/less powerful, and sex role as 
penetrator/penetrated” (Osiek and Pouya 2010:45).
17 Like similar words in other ancient languages, for “the majority of cases, these terms 
designate intelligent people with cognitive dysfunction” (Kellenberger 2013:450)
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of its effect and whether people were fully persuaded. Foolishness was a 
counter-claim to the imperial-focused emphasis, typical of philosophies 
of the time, on wisdom as practical lifestyle rather than (only) intellectual 
knowledge in the head and an apocalyptic informed reformatted wisdom. 
18 Similar to postcolonial mimicry where mockery is never too far removed 
from mimicry, Paul’s foolishness was strategic. If it is agreed that Paul’s 
rhetoric is best characterised by ambiguity, cunning and deception (Given 
2001), his discourse of foolishness entailed much more than merely playing 
the fool. Paul is not simply the stock figure of popular philosophical 
mockery, not simply the “village idiot” stereotype (but see Grau 2014:143–
45), or the effeminate weakling, but, in the reigning binaries of the time, 
simultaneously more and less than the stereotype. In the Roman theatre 
the fool is a lower-class clown, in contemporary society the mentally 
challenged was often a social outcast, people who identified with the poor 
and marginalised, and engages in behaviour that was contrary to established 
norms and convention. Moreover, like prostitutes and gladiators, stage 
actors and social outcasts were among the most marginalised of society, 
deemed to be without honour. Paul, however, did not fit this picture 
altogether, but rather that of the fool somewhat differently conceptualised, 
namely the fool as social hermeneut, as the trickster figure.19
Marion Grau (2014) argues, along the lines of Gadamer, that hermeneutics 
is operative when something is not immediately intelligible. It is of course 
a particularly intricate hermeneutical problem to make sense of the divine, 
of the experiences of God and the sacred. The attempt to make sense of, 
to translate or interpret the unintelligible, or the infinitely untranslatable, 
and not to admit to its impossibility, remains the ultimate challenge. This 
challenge Paul encountered in particularly trying circumstances, as the 
Johnny-come-lately apostle in socio-cultural hybrid communities in the 
fast-changing first century world. While Grau explains these notions for 
other contexts, Paul also shows aspects of the figures of Hermes, trickster, 
18 Crucial for making sense of Paul, is his apocalyptic theological orientation, in other 
words, politics writ large, with God and the powers engaged in a cosmic battle, replicated 
on another level in the human history of earthly realities and power struggles. See 
in this regard especially the work of Beker (1982, 1990), Keck (1984, 2015, 1993) and 
Martyn (1985, 2000).
19 For Paul’s appropriation of the role of the fool in 1 Corinthians 1–4, see Welborn 
(Welborn 2002:420–35).
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and fool tied together in his own self-presentation. Simulating these figures 
to some extent, Paul too revealed, performed, and challenged the status 
quo of his society and its structures of power, knowledge and belief. Paul 
encouraged but also modelled, particularly through the image of the fool, 
the interaction between humility and courage in reinterpreting the divine 
through mythos and logos for and in the recently formed communities 
of Jesus followers. “The holy fool can be a diagnostic tool, a test for the 
level of madness of the system, which often turns out to be greater than 
the madness of the holy fool” (Grau 2014, 148). Without giving up on the 
notoriously multivalent nature of hermeneutical acts, Paul reinterpreted 
God and his received traditions, and Jesus and his impact on the world, 
from the vantage point of the trickster-fool.20
Paul’s deployment of the foolishness discourse also served another, 
important purpose in his apostolic role. In a recent contribution, Horner 
(2018:42) provides a thicker description of Paul’s rhetoric, and concludes on 
Paul’s invocation of foolishness: “Paul shamed the pseudo-apostles through 
the Fool’s Speech. In so doing, he incarnates his assertion in 1 Corinthians 
that God has chosen the foolish to shame the wise”. Horner argues that 
Paul’s opponents opened themselves up for his sardonic yet rhetorically 
powerful riposte when they presented themselves as being superior to Paul. 
Paul presented their portrayal of him as socially completely despicable 
according to Greco-Roman standards as deriving from his openness to 
public punishment but also from his foolishness in his public speech. In 
the context of Corinth in particular, with its aspirations of sophistication, 
his opponents in all likelihood presented Paul as the ultimate fool. 
Paul’s rhetorical retort masterfully struck at those very claims which his 
opponents levelled at him, laying claim himself to the reigning foolishness 
discourse. Availing himself of the social inversion which foolishness 
introduces, taking up possible physical shortcomings and verbal deficits, 
Paul played the fool with his opponents and showed them up as pseudo-
apostles. Playing the fool, Paul put not only his person, but also his message 
20 Also, more generally and noted briefly earlier, Toner too acknowledges that mental 
challenges were not uniformly or consistently negatively experienced. “Mental disorder 
had always acted in some guises as a positive social force. Possession and exorcism 
acquired the power to change the individual and then reintegrate him or her into society 
in a new form of dependency with certain divinely blessed healers” (Toner 2009:90).
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(as will be illustrated in the next section), beyond reproach, mimicking 
the person and cross of Jesus, and issue an invitation and challenge to his 
recipients to likewise emulate Jesus Christ in their own lives – to the glory 
of God.
For Paul, then, invoking foolishness became a coping mechanism. In the 
harsh first-century environment, for those people at the lowest rungs of 
the social order, even mental disorder could have been used as a survival 
strategy. In a largely hostile environment, aggressive, antisocial behaviour 
was one more coping mechanism that contributed to the creation of a 
protective layer. “Individuals were able to play on perceptions of mental 
disorder to find relief in aggression or even complete social withdrawal” 
(Toner 2009:87). It therefore comes as no surprise that in 2 Corinthians 
12:11, Paul accuses his addressees right back: Γέγονα ἄφρων, ὑμεῖς με 
ἠναγκάσατε. Paul’s foolishness which is the twin of weakness, both of 
which in a counter-indication of masculinity, he places before the door of 
his community, not even the detractors. “Fools are hermeneutical artists, 
able to speak about things in circumlocutionary ways, to deliver points 
others dare not make for fear of displeasing the recipient of the message, 
and get away with telling the truth because they told it in ways that were 
socially sanctioned and provided a venue for a version of free speech in 
otherwise highly ritualized and guarded settings” (Grau 2014:150). So 
too, not only Paul’s person, but also (or especially even) Paul’s message 
emulated the discourse of foolishness, even if he did not fully escape the 
accompanying ambiguities.
4. Foolishness discourse: Paul’s message
Paul’s foolish message is impossible to separate from the folly of the cross, 
as he himself attested in 1 Corinthians 2:5. For some scholars, the Pauline 
discourse of foolishness incorporates the deliberate parody situated in the 
cross, since with crucifixion Empire aimed to show the uppity ones what 
happens when they do not know their hierarchical place, lifting them up in 
an altogether different but deadly way (Marcus 2006:73–87).21 For Paul, the 
21 “The writer of Colossians has grasped the connection between the parody of the 
triumphal entry and the parody of the cross. In a thoroughly ironic passage, the writer 
holds together both images in proclaiming Christ’s work. On the cross Jesus ‘disarmed 
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parody, of course, runs deeper, and Paul exploited the parodic elements in 
his insistence on the larger divine inversion in Christ: ὅτι τὸ μωρὸν τοῦ θεοῦ 
σοφώτερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τοῦ θεοῦ ἰσχυρότερον 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων (God’s foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, and God’s 
weakness is stronger than human strength, 1 Cor 1:25). It is therefore valid 
and important to argue that “For Paul, too, the cross is an interruption. 
The cross is an apocalyptic interruption or invasion of the old age – the 
old myths and conventions and rationalities of the world – by the new” 
(Campbell and Cilliers 2012:21). Pauline apostleship never strayed too far 
from Paul’s apostolic convictions, in the sense that his being apostle also 
carried the message, and vice versa.
For Paul, cruciform foolishness established a new, radical and apocalyptic-
grounded reality. As Nasrallah (2003:93) puts it, “Paul’s championing of 
divine folly and his downgrading of human wisdom are part of a discourse 
of madness and rationality, deployed in a context of struggle”. It is tempting 
to see Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians as praise of rationality, over against 
the emotional approach of the opponents in Corinth. However, such a 
reading fails to understand that Paul’s focus is not on reason per se, but is 
directed rather at issues that can be called foundational or epistemological 
(Stowers 1990:253). For Paul, the God of order can also be the God of 
disorder, especially when it comes to human social frameworks. And in the 
end, God’s foolishness is wiser than human wisdom, God’s weakness more 
capable than human power.22 Paul did not argue for rationality but sided 
instead with folly in his challenge of human pretensions to wisdom. Unlike 
the long scholarly tradition which holds that Paul introduced the dichotomy 
of “subdued versus frenzied or conscious versus unconscious”, he appears 
rather to juxtapose and consider what was conventionally understood to 
qualify as folly and wisdom or knowledge (Nasrallah 2003:93).
the rulers and authorities and made a public example of them, triumphing over them in 
it’ (Col 2:15)” (Campbell and Cilliers 2012:26).
22 The ambiguity of God entails God’s apparent contradictory nature when it comes to 
order and disorder: not only did God make “the various maps of persons, places, times, 
and things that organize and structure the world and the life of the church”, but God 
also “turns the world upside down and creates new maps” (Neyrey 2004:144–90, esp 
187). See Neyrey (2004:179–87) for Paul on God’s weakness and foolishness.
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It is important, therefore, not to romanticise or, to use another word, 
theologise the notion of foolishness in Paul, and to stay alert about the 
consequences that such tendencies have had on the interpretation of the 
Pauline letters over a long period. As Nasralla (2003) recently demonstrated, 
early Jesus follower communities accused each other’s prophets of madness 
and of making false claims to divine knowledge. The early Christians 
were not primarily interested in defining true prophecy or madness and 
rationality, but rather used this discourse in order to control knowledge, 
to establish their own authority, and to define Christian identity. Jesus 
followers launched these arguments in the context of the Greek and Roman 
world, where prophecy, visions, ecstasy, and dreams – all considered part 
of the same phenomenon – were the subject of innovative philosophical, 
medical, and even political debates.23 In a situation where σοφία was related 
more to the imitation of praxis as was the case in Hellenistic philosophies, 
wisdom and foolishness concerned more than theoretical contents.
Treating 1 Corinthians as probably the earliest written treatise on Christian 
prophecy, Paul’s argument is not primarily aimed to debunk the rationality 
of prophecy. Using the foolishness discourse, his ultimate aim evidently 
was to contrast the ostensible wisdom of the world with the foolishness of 
God. Although one aspect of this argument is to persuade the Corinthian 
recipients of his letter to reconsider their claim that they are spiritual 
people, Paul’s focus remains divine knowledge. He concedes that the 
Corinthians can legitimately insist that they possess various spiritual gifts 
including prophecy and tongues, but that these are limited in their ability 
to reproduce the wisdom of God. Therefore, rather than pneumatikoi as 
they claimed, the Corinthians are really psychikoi, or maybe even sarkikoi. 
Paul contrasts God’s supposed foolishness with the wisdom of the world, 
stressing the all-surpassing superiority of the former, and in this way he 
removed the basis of the Corinthians’ haughtiness and reaffirmed divine 
23 Arguing that a model of struggle informed by feminist theory and postcolonial 
criticism provides a better framework for understanding early Christian texts, Nasralla 
(2003) clarifies how early Christian arguments about rationality, madness, and the role 
of spiritual gifts in history are attempts to negotiate authority and to define religious 
identity in the midst of many competing forms of Christianity. Early Christian 
prophecy has usually been interpreted according to a model which explains that at 
its origins, Christianity was characterized by vibrant spiritual gifts which declined as 
church order and institutions developed.
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knowledge (Nasrallah 2003). Through the discourse of foolishness, Paul not 
only devalued the Corinthians’ ecstatic experience as marker for wisdom, 
but he also confirmed the non-world-conforming nature of God’s wisdom, 
as exemplified in the cross of Jesus.
5. Conclusion
Paul’s foolishness discourse resonates in interesting ways in South 
Africa. Historically, the history of the fool remained socially significant 
if ambiguous until the end of the middle ages, when it entered a time of 
transition and conflict in the sixteenth century. “Folly, whether sacred 
or secular, real or feigned, had now to contend with a new, strident and 
essentially hostile worldly wisdom” (Saward 1980, 99). In South Africa 
today, foolishness is considered best avoided in the young democracy 
with colonial legacies uppermost in the minds of many, and the lasting 
impact of hegemony still tangible in the democratic dispensation with its 
own problems and concerns (Punt 2013). Pauline foolishness discourse 
today, and in South Africa too, sounds meaningless and useless. Moving 
away from the systematising, theologising tendencies so typical of Pauline 
interpretation, and coming to terms with the social locations of these letters, 
allows for more accountable and meaningful exegesis. For Paul, aware of 
the import and consequence of his foolishness discourse, his rhetoric of 
the fool was calculated and focused. Paul’s rhetoric did not entail that 
he fooled around, nor that he was anybody’s fool. To the contrary, Paul’s 
foolishness was marked by wisdom, and as Christ’s fool, he aspired not 
to be the stock-type of first-century society, which becomes evident when 
the ancient context and its ambiguities are recognised. How is a foolish 
apostle propounding a foolishness discourse appropriated today? Some 
have suggested reaffirming Paul’s notions, albeit in new terms, that “(e)
specially in a post-Christendom era, the symbol of the foolish, clowning 
God may make new sense” (Grau 2014:144). In the end, Paul’s preference 
for the foolish should not be turned against foolishness or himself, so as to 
domesticate the unruly, or to impose another all-consuming regimen. 
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